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Abstract
Fighting outlaw motorcycle gangs is currently one of the top
priorities of many governments around the world. This is
due to the notion that outlaw motorcycle gangs do not con-
sist solely of motorcycle enthusiasts. Numerous cases reveal
that these clubs, or at least their members, are involved in
(organised) crime. In order to tackle these clubs, the former
Dutch Minister of Security and Justice announced a whole-
of-government strategy towards outlaw motorcycle gangs
in 2012. As part of this effort, authorities such as the Dutch
National Police, the Public Prosecution Service, the Dutch
Tax Authority and local governments aim to cooperate in
order to disrupt and restrict outlaw motorcycle gangs by
means of Criminal, Administrative and Civil Law. Part of this
strategy is to hinder club-related events. This article discuss-
es the latter strategy in light of the distinction between pre-
vention and pre-emption. As the latter two concepts are
often used interchangeably, this article attempts to use a
more strict division between prevention and pre-emption.
Thereby, it becomes apparent that outlaw motorcycle gangs
are to some extent governed through uncertainty. The
author suggests that maintaining the ‘prevention–pre-emp-
tion distinction’ can offer an interesting and valuable point
of departure for analysing today’s crime policies.
Keywords: Prevention, pre-crime, pre-emption, risk, outlaw
motorcycle gangs
1 Introduction
In 2014, a local Harley-Davidson club in the Nether-
lands was planning – as it aims to do every year – to
organise a motorcycle fair from 11 April until 13 April.
Because this motorcycle fair has always taken place
without any problems, the mayor of the municipality of
‘Laarbeek’ initially issued a permit based on which the
club was allowed to organise this event yet again. How-
ever, the municipality withdrew the assigned permit on
the advice of the Dutch National Police as the latter
expressed considerable concerns with regard to possible
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public order and safety disturbances.1 This was espe-
cially the case because the Dutch National Police feared
an escalation of violence between warring outlaw motor-
cycle gangs (henceforth OMGs).2 This incident was not
an isolated case as a second motorcycle fair ‘Motorcycle-
day Zilst’ in another municipality was also cancelled by
the local government for similar reasons. The event,
scheduled for 20 April 2014, was to be organised for the
first time by ‘Harley-Davidson Club de Kempen’.3 Fur-
thermore, the ‘Harley-day’, in the village of Valkens-
waard, and the motorcycle event ‘American Day Uitge-
est’, both scheduled for 26 April 2014, also did not take
place. It seems that these withdrawals of permits were
not unique for this period of time, as the local govern-
ment of the small village of Cuijk had also prohibited
the gathering of several international OMGs in May
2013. On this occasion, members of the Dutch Veterans
MC were planning to organise a three-day event called
the ‘Brothers in Arms Run’. However, the municipality
of Cuijk decided not to provide the required permit for
the event, fearing possible public disorder. Moreover,
the Mayor of Cuijk argued that prohibiting the event
would be in line with the Dutch nationwide policy to
1. See <https:// extranet. laarbeek. nl/ actueel/ nieuws_ 3139/ item/ vergun
ning -motorbeurs -aarle -rixtel -ingetrokken_ 12617. html> (last visited
3 August 2015).
2. In academic literature but also in various policy documents, different
‘labels’ are being used to refer to outlaw motorcycle gangs. Some
authors refer to these clubs as ‘1%-Motorcycle Clubs’ or ‘1%-MCs’,
while others prefer to use the term ‘outlaw motorcycle clubs’ (see, for
example, A. Blokland, M. Soudijn & E. Teng, ‘Wij zijn geen padvinders.
Een verkennend onderzoek naar de criminele carrieres van leden van
1%-motorclubs’, 56 Tijdschrift voor Criminologie 3 (2014). A. Veno
and J. van den Eynde, ‘Moral Panic Neutralization Project: A Media-
based Intervention’, 17 Journal of Community & Applied Social Psy-
chology 490 (2007). The Dutch Government, however, currently main-
tains the term ‘Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs’. Note that this article is not
about OMGs itself, but about the Dutch approach towards clubs that
are labeled as ‘outlaw motorcycle gangs’. In March 2014, the Dutch
National Police documented fifteen ‘outlaw motorcycle gangs’, such as
the Hells Angels MC, Satudarah MC, Veterans MC and No Surrender
MC. For a complete overview of the listed OMGs in the Netherlands in
April 2014, see Politie Landelijk Eenheid, Outlawbikers in Nederland
(2014), at 19. For the sake of convenience and because I am taking the
approach of the Dutch Government as the point of departure for this
article, I chose to use the term ‘outlaw motorcycle gang’ in accordance
with the Dutch Government.
3. See <www. omroepbrabant. nl/ ?news/ 208924962/ Motordag+Zilst+in
+Veldhoven+ook+afgelast+om+onrust+motorwereld. aspx> (last visited
3 august 2015).
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fight OMGs.4 Indeed, the former Dutch Minister of
Security and Justice, Mr. Opstelten, argued that it is
important to make a clear statement that the so-called
‘outlaw motorcycle gangs’ are not to be ‘facilitated’ in
the Netherlands.5
The latter statement – considering the literature on the
linkage between OMGs and (organised) crime – clearly
did not appear out of thin air. According to many
researchers, law enforcement agencies and the Dutch
Ministry of Security and Justice, it seems reasonable to
assert that OMGs are involved in (organised) crime.6 At
the same time, researchers argue that it would be unjust
to presume OMGs to be criminal enterprises by defini-
tion.7 Research shows that there are important differen-
ces among OMGs concerning the number of convic-
tions of OMG members, as well as the nature and seri-
ousness of the committed crimes.8 The Dutch National
Police seems to agree with this view, stating that it is not
self-evident that every ‘outlaw biker’ is criminally active
by definition.9
More generally, OMGs have been a foremost priority
on the political agendas of many countries around the
world. For instance, having its roots in California
(1948), the arrival of the Hells Angels MC in Canada led
to numerous gang-related incidents in the 1990s (also
known as the Quebec biker war), which urged the Cana-
dian Government to begin what Katz described as an
‘… all out crackdown to rid society of the Outlaw
Motorcycle Gang problem…’.10 The Nordic countries
have equally been startled by a ‘biker war’ between the
Hells Angels and the Bandidos. The ‘Great Nordic Bik-
er War’ in 1990s included numerous murders and
attempted murders across Denmark, Norway, Finland
and Sweden, which led to a strong focus on OMGs. For
instance, in Denmark a law was passed in 1996 that ena-
bled the police to ban members of the Hells Angels MC
from certain locations (e.g. a clubhouse).11 Moreover,
the German city of Hamburg first banned the Hells
Angels in 1983 (‘vereinsverbot’), which also made it
possible to ban Hells Angels-related symbols.12 Both the
Canadian and the Australian Governments also adopted
an anti-associations legislative model aimed at criminal-
4. See <www. bndestem. nl/ algemeen/ binnenland/ feest -motorclub -veter
ans -mag -doorgaan -1. 3808222> (last visited 11 August 2015).
5. Kamerstukken II, 2011/12, 29 911, no. 59.
6. For example, J. Quinn and D. Koch, ‘The Nature of Criminality within
One-Percent Motorcycle Clubs’, 24 Deviant Behavior 281 (2003); T.
Barker, Biker Gangs and Transnational Organized Crime (2014); M.
Lauchs, A. Bain & P. Bell., Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs: A Theoretical
Perspective (2015).
7. Barker, above n. 6 at 71; Lauchs and others, above n. 6, at 92.
8. Barker, above n. 6; Blokland and others, above n. 2.
9. Politie Landelijk Eenheid, above n. 2, at 19.
10. K. Katz, ‘The Enemy within: The Outlaw Motorcycle Gang Moral Panic’,
36 American Journal of Criminal Justice 231, at 244 (2011).
11. Barker, above n. 6, at 208; L. Korsell and P. Larsson, ‘Organized Crime
the Nordic Way’, 40 Crime and Justice 519, at 542 (2011). For more
information about the ‘Nordic approach’ towards OMGs, see also T.
Bjørgo, Preventing Crime: A Holistic Approach (2016), at 117.
12. Barkers, above n. 6, at 205; See <www. lto. de/ recht/ hintergruende/ h/
olg -hamburg -urteil -1 -31 -13 -hells -angels -kutte/> (last visited 25 July
2016).
ising associations between members of OMGs and, con-
sequently, to disrupt the OMGs as a whole.13
At the same time, however, there has also been a critical
debate on how OMGs are being approached. That is,
some measures have provoked concern because they
tend to forestall risks or crimes that have not yet taken
place. In this respect, Ayling has described the approach
towards OMGs, or ‘bikies’ in Australia as a ‘pre-emp-
tive strike’. The author has argued that this ‘strike’ aims
to pre-empt and not necessarily to prevent crime.14 In line
with this argument, some authors have stressed that
contemporary society is to some extent using pre-emp-
tive strategies – which is different from prevention – to
deal with risks, dangers and uncertainties.15 Although
Tulich stated that ‘… prevention and pre-emption are
conceptually distinct …’, the distinction between pre-
emption and prevention is not always clear.16
The distinction between the concepts of pre-emption
and prevention is the focus of this article. To lift a cor-
ner of the veil, the deployment of ‘preventive’ strategies
to inhibit a particular danger from happening is prece-
ded by a more balanced risk assessment, while still
accepting a certain amount of exposure to the danger.
Pre-emption goes a step further by taking matters into
its own hands. That is, by not accepting any risk of dan-
ger, pre-emptive strategies aim to take full control over
a ‘risky situation’ as though it were certain that the
feared danger will actually unfold.
The general aim of this article is to further illustrate
how the underlying (criminological) rationale of pre-
emptive strategies differs from the rationale of crime
prevention strategies. This is done in light of the recent
discussion on the ‘pre-emptive approach’ towards
OMGs in Australia, the growing worldwide attention
towards OMGs and the more stringent focus on OMG-
related activities in general. Specifically, I focus on three
instances where motorcycle events have been cancelled
by a local government in the Netherlands. I make use of
the jurisprudence related to the three preliminary pro-
ceedings at the Administrative Court. Although this
article focuses on the attempt to control the problem of
OMGs, it is clear that the discussion can be placed
within a much wider security discourse that is ‘…
13. For a more in-depth view of the Canadian and Australian approach
towards OMGs, see, for example, K. Katz, ‘The Enemy within: The Out-
law Motorcycle Gang Moral Panic’, 36 American Journal of Criminal
Justice 231 (2011); A. Loughnan, ‘The Legislation We Had to Have?:
The Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 (NSW)’ 20 Cur-
rent Issues in Criminal Justice 457 (2009); Lauchs and others, above n.
6, at 76-78; M.A. Moon, ‘Outlawing the Outlaws: Importing R.I.C.O.’s
Notion of ‘Criminal Enterprise into Canada to Combat Organized
Crime’, 24 Queens Law Journal 451 (1999).
14. J. Ayling, ‘Pre-emptive Strike: How Australia is Tackling Outlaw Motor-
cycle Gangs’, 36 American Journal of Criminal Justice 250, at 259
(2011).
15. R. Ericson, Crime in an Insecure World (2007); R. Pieterman, De Voor-
zorgscultuur. Streven naar Veiligheid in een Wereld vol Risico en
Onzekerheid (2008); A. Asworth and L. Zedner, Preventive Justice
(2014).
16. T. Tulich, ‘Prevention and Pre-emption in Australia’s Domestic Anti-ter-
rorism Legislation’, 1 International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social
Democracy 52, at 58 (2012).
123
Teun van Ruitenburg doi: 10.5553/ELR.000072 - ELR December 2016 | No. 3
increasingly dominated by the logic of risk management,
a logic which calls for the management and government
of risky populations by means of (statistical) calculations
and proactive management rather than through the
reactive management of real events and threats’.17
This article is organised as follows: Section 2 provides
the theoretical framework and discusses the theoretical
difference between pre-emptive and prevention strat-
egies. A brief introduction to the Dutch approach
towards OMGs is set forth in Section 3. Section 4
describes the three cases that are subsequently discussed
within the ‘pre-emption–prevention framework’ in Sec-
tion 5. The conclusion is presented in Section 6, and
Section 7 discusses the importance of making a clearer
distinction between pre-emption and prevention.
2 Tackling the Future
In this section, I first discuss the concept of pre-emp-
tion in relation to prevention. As Kortleven argued in
his dissertation about the meaning of pre-emption in the
Netherlands, the word ‘prevention’ is often used as an
all-purpose concept. As a result, in the literature the
concepts of pre-emption or precaution and prevention are
often put forward interchangeably. That is, the author
noted that in the context of pre-emption, strategies are
also just referred to as preventative strategies.18 This is
not strange because the differences between prevention
and pre-emptive strategies do not represent a clear
‘black and white’ distinction. In this respect, Dersho-
witz argued that ‘prevention, as an element of criminal
justice, is best seen as a continuum …’.19 Thus, as both
strategies aim to tackle a feared danger in the future,
pre-emption is best seen as a category of various preven-
tive strategies. Hebenton and Seddon seem to agree on
this by referring to a form of ‘radical prevention’.20
Using both concepts interchangeably unjustly nullifies
the different rationales underlying these two concepts.
In this article, I therefore take the differences between
pre-emption and prevention into consideration some-
what more strictly, arguing that prevention as a broad
and umbrella term (including pre-emption) is to be dis-
tinguished from prevention in a narrow sense, which is
thus distinct from pre-emption. It is important to make
such a distinction because today, crime prevention runs
the risk of becoming, as Haggerty puts it, ‘an overly
17. M. van der Woude, ‘Dutch Counterterrorism: An Exceptional Body of
Legislation or just an inevitable Product of the Culture of Control?’, in
A. Ellian and G. Molier (eds.), The State of Exception and Militant
Democracy in a Time of Terror (2002) 57, at 78-79.
18. W.J. Kortleven, Voorzorg in Nederland. Ontwikkelingen in de Maat-
schappelijke Omgang met Kindermishandeling, Verkeersonveiligheid
en Genetische modificatie (2013), at 70.
19. A.M. Dershowitz, Preemption: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways (2006), at
32.
20. B. Hebenton and T. Seddon, ‘From Dangerousness to Precaution: Man-
aging Sexual and Violent Offenders in an Insecure and Uncertain Age’,
49 British journal of Criminology 343, at 344 (2009).
inclusive concept’.21 By confronting the concept of pre-
vention with that of pre-emption – emphasis is sought
to be placed on the differences between both concepts.
The distinction I would like to address here is very
closely related to the often described changing nature of
how contemporary societies cope with risks and their
related dangers.22 While Garland speaks of a ‘Culture of
Control’, Beck has qualified contemporary society as a
(world) ‘Risk Society’.23 While the latter two have
somewhat divergent arguments, Borgers and Van Slie-
dregt conclude that both studies agree that the modern-
day adagio is: ‘… the protection of citizens against all
manner of dangers’.24 According to Ericson, this has led
to ‘… the alarming trend across Western countries of
treating every imaginable source of harm as a crime’.25
Several other authors have thus noticed a temporal shift
towards responding to crime in the direction of control-
ling risks.26 Generally, instead of focusing on committed
crimes, crime fighting has shifted towards anticipating
crimes that have not yet materialised. Thus, while the
‘post-crime society’ aims to detect actual wrongdoers by
taking a committed criminal offence as the guiding prin-
ciple (e.g. in order to prevent re-offending), the ‘pre-
crime society’ aims to thwart future harms for the pur-
pose of ‘security’. This pursuit of security entails identi-
fying threats and consequently, making interventions
before a criminal offence takes place.27 While McCul-
loch and Wilson, in their recent book on pre-crime,
emphasise that the novelty of pre-crime should not be
exaggerated, the authors do recognise that today, inter-
ventions are made to tackle less-imminent dangers or
crimes. Thus, so the authors argue, pre-crime is more
forward looking than prevention in the sense that it does
not take past (criminal) conduct as the benchmark to
assess the imminence of threat or future crimes: ‘…
crime prevention is principally aimed at thwarting the
recurrence of the past. Pre-crime, conversely, is not
aimed simply at preventing a repeat of past offending,
21. K.D. Haggerty, ‘From Risk to Precaution: The Rationalities of Personal
Crime Prevention’, in R. Ericson and A. Doyle (eds.), Risk and Morality
(2003) 193, at 193.
22. It is important to emphasise that danger is ‘… the potential for harm
that inheres in a thing, a person, or a situation…’, while risk is ‘… a
measure of that potential’s likelihood and extent’. The likelihood of a
particular danger to occur is thus expressed through risks. As a result,
Garland argues that there is no such thing as objective or actual risks:
‘… risk-assessments depend for their validity upon a prior system of
categorizations and metrics, which are in turn, grounded in specific con-
ventions, institutions, or ways of life’. D. Garland, ‘The Rise of Risk’, in
R. Ericson and A. Doyle (eds.), Risk and Morality (2003) 48, at 50-57.
23. U. Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992, reprint 2005);
D. Garland, The Culture of Control. Crime and Social Order in Con-
temporary Society (2002).
24. M. Borgers and E. Van Sliedregt, ‘The Meaning of the Precautionary
Principle for the Assessment of Criminal measures in the Fight against
Terrorism’, 2 Erasmus Law Review 171 (2009), at 172.
25. Ericson, above n. 15, at 1.
26. See, for example, B. Hudson, Justice in the Risk Society. Challenging
and Reaffirming Justice in Late Modernity (2003); L. Zedner, ‘Pre-crime
and Post-criminology?’, 11 Theoretical Criminology 261 (2007); Eric-
son, above n. 15; Pieterman, above n. 15.
27. Zedner, above n. 26.
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but at pre-empting offending altogether’.28 The result is
that the ‘pre-crime society’ tends to focus on identifying
and classifying suspicious groups – without worrying
about false positive identifications – rather than dealing
with individual offenders. Liability for pre-crime offen-
ces, consequently, ‘… is established on the basis of sus-
picion about the crimes an accused of this “type” might
commit, given the opportunity’.29 As a result of this, the
distinction between the offender and the suspect is not
as clear-cut as it was before. Ericson has stated that
agencies tend to criminalise not solely the people who
have actually committed a crime, but also the people
who are suspected of committing a crime in the future.30
In a similar way, Feeley and Simon have elaborated on
the subject of controlling groups rather than punishing
individual offenders. The authors explain that an
important element of today’s ‘New Penology’ is the pro-
cess of identifying and managing groups justified by
their risk profiles.31 As a result, groups that are regarded
as ‘dangerous’ tend to be excluded from society.32
Recently, there has also been a stronger focus on
addressing, or criminalising, seemingly innocent acts
that are less imminent and temporally further removed
from the actual substantive crime.33 One striking exam-
ple of this is the imprisonment of five OMG members
in Australia in 2014, because of their buying ice creams
as a group. This followed from the controversial Vicious
Lawless Association Disestablishment Act 2013.34
2.1 Pre-Emptive Strategies versus Prevention
Strategies
Hence, it seems agreed upon that coping with crime is
concerned not only with reacting to conducted crimes
but increasingly with the prevention of crime. However,
prevention of (organised) crime is at the same time a
rather broad and vague concept, and some scholars have
argued that ‘… new developments are occurring under
the rubric of crime prevention’.35 That is, the shift
towards the ‘pre-crime society’ approach seems to be
increasingly dominated by a precautionary principle.36
While the latter principle has been a dominant principle
28. J. McCulloch and D. Wilson, Pre-crime. Pre-emption, Pre-caution and
the Future (2016), at 3.
29. Ibid., at 20.
30. Ericson, above n. 15, at 1.
31. M. Feeley and J. Simon, ‘The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging
Strategy for Corrections’, 30 Criminology 449 (1992).
32. Hudson, above n. 26, at 75.
33. McCulloch and Wilson, above n. 28, at 17-18.
34. Ibid., at 136; See <www. goldcoastbulletin. com. au/ news/ crime -court/
bikie -association -charges -dropped -against -men -buying -ice -cream -on -
gold -coast -holiday/ news -story/
d0ca09cf34d61c140380257bb5e1215b>.
35. H. van de Bunt and C. van der Schoot, ‘Introduction’, in H. van de Bunt
and C. van der Schoot (eds.), Prevention of Organised Crime. A Situa-
tional Approach (2003) 17, at 17; Haggerty, above n. 21, at 193.
36. M. Schuilenburg, ‘De paradox van het Voorzorgsbeginsel. Over ‘un-
kunk’ en uitsluiting’, in D. Siegel and others (eds.), Culturele criminolo-
gie (2008) 57.
in international environmental law since the 1990s,37
various scholars have argued that this principle has also
been adopted in relation to other fields. As a result, sim-
ilarly to what Ayling has done with regard to the Aus-
tralian approach towards OMGs, and McCulloch and
Pickering in relation to counterterrorism strategies, it
has been advocated that a differentiation is called for
between the meaning of pre-emptive strategies and what
is commonly understood as crime prevention
strategies.38 In this respect, as noted in the introduction,
the Australian approach towards OMGs in Australia has
deliberately been characterised as a ‘pre-emptive
strike’.39 Thus has Ayling emphasised the difference
between pre-emption and prevention.
In general, crime prevention is about non-punitive
measures that take away opportunities to commit
crime.40 Furthermore, crime prevention is about fight-
ing dangers that are calculable and demonstrable and are
thus put forward on the basis of predictions and risk
assessments. In theory, whether or not to apply a certain
prevention strategy depends on a cost-benefit analysis.
In other words, the risk that a danger will actually occur
and the costs of the prevention strategy are both taken
into account.41 The concept of (crime) prevention and
thus the underlying decision-making processes are
grounded in a more objectified risk assessment of the
feared danger. Pre-emption, on the other hand, focuses
more on the prevention of (future) dangers despite the
uncertainty that the feared dangers will actually unfold.
These uncertain dangers are treated ‘… as if they had
already happened …’, and the (pre-emptive) interven-
tions are implemented in order to prevent a possible
hazardous situation at all costs.42 While prevention focu-
ses on imminent or foreseeable threats, pre-emption
thus targets uncertain situations. Simply put, pre-emp-
tion is about preventing uncertain dangers that might
arise in the future. Importantly, pre-emptive strategies
are also – compared with prevention strategies – to a
lesser extent attuned to the level of threat. Pre-emption
therefore puts more emphasis on the possible negative
effects of a particular situation and pays less attention to
the actual chance that the danger will occur.43
Treating both concepts as ‘ideal types’, Kortleven has
pointed to three key features that help to untangle the
37. At the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
held in Rio de Janeiro (3-14 June 1992), the following definition of the
precautionary approach was adopted (Principle 15): ‘in order to protect
the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by
States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used
as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environ-
mental degradation …’. UNCED, Rio-Declaration, Principle 15.
38. Ayling, above n. 14; J. McCulloch and S. Pickering, ‘Pre-Crime and
Counter Terrorism: Imagining Future Crime in the War on Terror’, 49
British Journal of Criminology 628 (2009).
39. Ayling, above n. 14, at 259.
40. McCulloch and Pickering, above n. 38, at 629.
41. R. Prins and H. Boutellier, ‘De Lokale Voorzorgcultuur. Over de steeds
naar voren erkende Overheid in de Aanpak van Sociale Onveiligheid’, 9
Tijdschrift voor Veiligheid 3, at 5-7 (2010).
42. McCulloch and Wilson, above n. 28, at 1.
43. Schuilenburg, above n. 36, at 57; Prins and Boutellier, above n. 41, at 7.
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different underlying principles of prevention strategies
and strategies of pre-emption.44 These differences are
believed to act as a justification for distinguishing
between both concepts. By doing so, Kortleven has built
on the literature proclaiming that contemporary society
has shifted from a modern risk culture towards a late
modern precautionary culture.45 I will elaborate on
these three features in what follows. Note that the fol-
lowing three features are interrelated and thus show
some overlap. Untangling the concept of pre-emption in
this way, however, is helpful to pinpoint the differences
with prevention strategies.
2.1.1 Prevention at All Costs
First, the prevention of loss is deemed much more
important with pre-emptive strategies than with preven-
tion strategies. Although prevention strategies are
indeed aimed at preventing harm, they are not expected
to prevent all possible harms.46 In other words, a certain
amount of damage is accepted and is believed to be
unavoidable. Whether or not to promote a prevention
strategy in a certain situation is largely a result of ‘calcu-
lation and scientific insight’.47 In other words, a cost-
benefit analysis is carried out in which the costs of a
strategy are weighed against the chance that the danger
will occur vis-à-vis the estimated damage that it causes
(the risk). These costs, unsurprisingly, include the
amount of money it costs to implement the particular
strategy, but could also include other possible side
effects of a measure such as the limitation of one’s per-
sonal freedom and/or negative (crime) displacement
effects. Damage, on the other hand, is to be understood
as the costs that are involved when the feared danger
eventually materialises. In this respect, one can think of
all sorts of costs, such as material costs, physical costs or
environmental costs, depending on the specific
context.48 Pre-emptive strategies, however, do not reck-
on with the idea of damage or loss to begin with. That
is, pre-emptive measures aim to prevent damage at all
costs and do not weigh the costs of a certain interven-
tion. In other words, the costs of an intervention are
deemed to be less important as the prevention of the
harm is regarded as the topmost priority. In this way,
prevention strives for optimal security, while pre-emp-
tion seeks to provide maximal security.49 To make this
distinction even clearer, it is insightful to refer to a dis-
tinction Hudson (2003) has made between the concepts
of risk management and risk control.50
44. Kortleven, above n. 18, at 54.
45. Pieterman, above n. 15.
46. Kortleven, above n. 18, at 41.
47. Prins and Boutellier, above n. 41, at 6.
48. For a further reading on the role of cost-benefit analysis in crime poli-
cies, see, for example, F. van Tulder, ‘Afweging van kosten en baten in
criminaliteit(sbestrijding)’, 47 Tijdschrift voor Criminologie 291 (2005).
49. Pieterman, above n. 15; Schuilenburg, above n. 36, at 58.
50. Hudson, above n. 26, at 50; for a further discussion on this difference
see also T. Clear, T. and E. Cadora, ‘Risk and Correctional Practice’, in
K. Stenson and R. Sullivan (eds.), Crime, Risk and Justice: The Politics
of Crime Control in Liberal Democracies (2001) 51.
In describing how contemporary societies cope with
‘risky’ situations and people, Hudson has emphasised
the difference between risk management and risk con-
trol. Risk management agrees with the notion that a risk
situation is always associated with a certain amount of
uncertainty. Since uncertainty is accepted and believed
to be inherent to risk situations, risk management tech-
niques do not focus on eliminating these uncertainties.
In fact, techniques of risk management aim to cope with
these uncertainties in such a way that they are reduced
to a minimum. In doing so, risk management takes into
account the costs of so-called ‘false positives’. That is, it
aims to prevent people from being falsely accused of
having committed a crime. The strategy of risk control,
on the other hand, does not aim to actually manage
risks, but focuses on controlling risks. This means that
risk control strategies do not accept the existence of
uncertainties. As a result, risk control measures aim to
take absolute control over situations that are deemed ris-
ky as a means to reassure that a would-be offender is
unable to commit a crime. Consequently, risk control
strategies attach less weight to false positives since the
primary objective of these strategies is to prevent the
risky situation at all costs, even when it is not entirely
certain whether the feared ‘risky’ situation will unfold.
By differentiating between these two strategies, Hudson
stated that contemporary society increasingly tends to
act upon strategies of risk control in order to cope with
risky situations in such a way that (presumed) risky sit-
uations are neutralised beforehand.51 With this in mind,
one could, for example, argue that holding presumed
‘terrorists’ captive at the Guantanamo Bay detention
camp is not a measure of risk management, but one of
risk control.
2.1.2 Preventing Uncertain Situations
The second feature described by Kortleven relates to
the problem of uncertainty. Put simply, the author has
argued that today’s spirit of pre-emption prescribes that
– contrary to prevention strategies – a lack of knowledge
about the nature, size and cause of the risk at hand is no
reason not to implement a (pre-emptive) measure.52
Therefore, many authors have argued that strategies of
pre-emption are based on the previously mentioned
‘precautionary principle’. Although it is agreed that it is
difficult to provide a clear-cut definition of this princi-
ple and that the practical meaning is, moreover, believed
to differ from one context to the other, this principle is
usually operationalised as follows: ‘… if and when a
threat of serious or irreparable harm arises, a lack of sci-
entific certainty cannot apply as a reason not to take or
to postpone preventive measures’.53 This principle urg-
es one to pre-empt danger even when it is far from cer-
tain that the danger will actually unfold. In the face of
irreversible damage to society, there is no place for risk
in the meaning of risk management as the costs of these
risks are deemed to be high when materialised. With
51. Hudson, above n. 26, at 50.
52. Kortleven, above n. 18, at 54.
53. Borgers and Van Sliedregt, above n. 24, at 183.
126
ELR December 2016 | No. 3 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000072
respect to these types of risks (e.g. environmental disas-
ters or large-scale terrorist attacks), one longs for cer-
tainty.54 In other words, where prevention strategies
avoid calculated risks, pre-emptive strategies aim to
avoid uncertainty (better safe than sorry).55 Obviously,
this does not mean that all preventative action related to
severe and irreversible damage is pre-emptive by defini-
tion. What makes these strategies pre-emptive, however,
is the notion that the uncertainty often related to such
cases calls for far-reaching risk-aversive strategies.
While the precautionary principle was originally devel-
oped as a way of reasoning in the context of averting
potential environmental dangers, Ericson has argued
that this principle can also be recognised in contempo-
rary approaches towards crime. The author has argued
that the problem of uncertainty (i.e. the problem of not
being able to base decisions on scientific forms of
knowledge) has led to a ‘politics of uncertainty’, which
has consequently resulted in the intensification of secur-
ity measures.56 As ‘uncertainty’ gives rise to the desire
to avoid risks, ‘uncertainty’ has become the new basis
for governing crime and thus for safeguarding security.
The amount of knowledge upon which pre-emptive
strategies are based is also lower because ‘… pre-emp-
tion permits interventions that are so far removed from
the anticipated harm …’.57
2.1.3 Risk Assessments Are Less Important
The third feature that can also be recognised when
thinking about pre-emption is closely linked to the two
preceding differences. That is, besides the idea that
uncertain risks as such do not constitute a barrier to the
implementation of an intervention, less importance is
also attached to risk assessments as a whole. In other
words, risk assessments are to a lesser extent the deter-
mining factor for preventative action. This is due to the
idea that taking risks is not accepted under the precau-
tionary logic. Namely, taking risks would leave open the
possibility of false ‘negatives’, which Hebenton and
Seddon described as ‘… incorrectly rating a person as
“safe” …’.58 Such an error could subsequently result in
(catastrophic) dangers. As I noted before, it is the sole
possibility of such a consequence that pre-emptive
interventions aim to eliminate. In this respect, Furedi
also speaks of a shift towards possibilistic risk manage-
ment, which symbolises a shift away from ‘probability-
based risk analysis’.59
54. Hebenton and Seddon, above n. 20, at 358.
55. Prins and Boutellier, above n. 41, at 7.
56. Ericson, above n. 15, at 1.
57. Tulich, above n. 16, at 59.
58. Hebenton and Seddon, above n. 20, at 252.
59. F. Furedi, ‘Precautionary Culture and the Rise of Possibilistic Risk
Assessment’, 2 Erasmus Law Review 197, at 205 (2009).
3 The Dutch Approach
towards Outlaw Motorcycle
Gangs
Before applying and further discussing the aforemen-
tioned differences between pre-emption and prevention,
this section will briefly provide the context in which
OMGs are being approached in the Netherlands. More-
over, it will explain why the approach towards OMGs,
in particular, acts as an interesting case to explore the
meaning of pre-emption.
3.1 The ‘Uncertainty’ of ‘Outlaw Motorcycle
Gangs’
As noted in the introduction, there remains a certain
amount of ‘uncertainty’ in the literature about the exact
(criminal) nature of OMGs as a whole.60 Consequently,
Ayling argued that it would be unjust to assume that
OMGs consist solely of criminals.61 The recent findings
of Blokland and others seem to be in line with this view
as some OMGs are believed to be more ‘radical’ than
others.62 In other words, ‘… the available literature on
OMGs does not provide for a clear answer to the ques-
tion: Are all outlaw motorcycle clubs (1%-clubs) crimi-
nal gangs …?’63 While the latter is more an empirical
and criminological question, up to now, no OMGs in
the Netherlands have – by means of Criminal Law –
been declared a criminal organisation.64 The Dutch
Public Prosecution Service has, moreover, unsuccessful-
ly tried to prohibit the Hells Angels MC by means of
the Dutch Civil Code on several occasions.65 While it is
beyond the scope of this article to discuss at length all
the Civil cases, the judgments in these cases have shown
that it is difficult to legally ascribe individual criminal
60. It is important to emphasise that this literature does not underplay the
link of OMGs with (organised) crime. In fact, Blokland and others have
shown that most members in their dataset have a criminal record. It is
argued, however, that it is unclear whether all OMGs should be under-
stood as criminal organisations by definition. Blokland and others,
above n. 2.
61. Ayling, above n. 14, at 260-61.
62. Blokland and others, above n. 2.
63. Barker, above n. 6, at 71.
64. In 2007, the Public Prosecution Service tried to prosecute the Hells
Angels MC as a criminal organisation (Art. 140 Dutch Criminal Code). It
must be said that in this case, the Public Prosecution Service was
declared inadmissible owing to infringements on the rights of the sus-
pects. Therefore, the Court did not discuss this case on its contents
(Dutch Court 20 December 2007, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2007:BC0685).
65. When the activities of a legal entity are believed to be contradictory to
the public order, the Public Prosecution Service is able to request the
Court to prohibit and abolish the legal entity in question (Art. 20 sub-
section 1 of the Dutch Civil Code). It is important to notice that Art.
2:20 of the Civil Code is thus not based on Criminal Law. The Criminal
Code in the Netherlands focuses on the individual offender. Instead,
Art. 2:20 originates from the Dutch Civil Code and aims to prohibit
foundations and associations of which the activity is alien to the public
order. In this case, not the individuals within these organisations are the
main concern, but organisations as such are being dissolved.
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behaviour to the legal entity of an OMG.66 Any criminal
activities of a single OMG member cannot, by their very
nature, be ascribed to the legal entity of the OMG.67 A
request to prohibit an entity can be granted only if it is
deemed to be a necessary means to prevent conduct that
actually violates commonly accepted democratic founda-
tions and could possibly have a disruptive effect on soci-
ety. Kesteloo, however, concluded that this ‘public
order principle’ – in the context of the prohibition and
abolishment of a legal person – is applied with great ret-
icence.68 All in all, the Supreme Court gives much
weight to respecting the right to freedom of peaceful
assembly and freedom of association (Article 11
ECHR).69 Hence, although there are ample indications
that members of some OMGs are guilty of various seri-
ous crimes, in the Netherlands there remains some
(legal) ‘uncertainty’ surrounding the criminality of some
OMGs as a whole.
Moreover, while in the Netherlands no OMGs have
been prohibited yet, something else might have further
amplified the uncertainty surrounding the criminal
nature of OMGs. As noted in the introduction, the
Dutch Government currently maintains that the term
‘outlaw motorcycle gang’ refers to motorcycle clubs that
are believed to undermine the rule of law. However, the
Dutch National Police has noted that not all clubs that
have been listed as ‘outlaw motorcycle gang’ have – by
definition – been under criminal investigation.70 In oth-
er words, it is not necessary for members of a motorcy-
cle club to be guilty of crimes in order to have their club
listed as an ‘outlaw motorcycle gang’. In the meantime,
these listed ‘gangs’ are, as a result, subject to a nation-
wide policy. In this way, one could say that the percep-
tion of the existence of ‘outlaw motorcycle gangs’ is real
in its consequences.
I would like to stress that this line of reasoning does not
underplay the gravity of crime within some OMGs. In
fact, ample examples have revealed that members of
some OMGs are indeed guilty of a wide range of serious
and organised crimes. This paragraph, however, does
reveal that it remains uncertain whether all listed ‘out-
law motorcycle gangs’ can – in legal terms – be regarded
as criminal organisations. As the concept of uncertainty
plays a pivotal role under the ‘logic-of-pre-emption’, the
example of OMGs is an interesting case to reveal how
state agencies deal with this uncertainty.
66. See e.g. Dutch Court of Appeal 10 April 2008, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:
2008:BC9212; Dutch Court of Appeal 25 April 2008, ECLI:NLGHSHE:
2008:BD0560; Dutch Supreme Court 26 June 2009 ECLI:NL:HR:
2009:BI1124.
67. Dutch Court of Appeal 10 April 2008, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2008:BC9212,
at no. 4.10.2.
68. A. Kesteloo, Deelneming aan een Criminele Organisatie. Een Onder-
zoek naar de Strafbaarstellingen in Artikel 140 Sr (2011), at 87.
69. T.J. van der Ploeg, ‘Hoe moeilijk is het om een vereniging -of andere
rechtspersoon- te verbieden?’, 16 Nederlands Juristenblad 1094
(2012).
70. Politie Landelijke Eenheid, above n. 2, at 19.
3.2 A Zero-Tolerance Approach towards OMGs
At the start of the year 2012, the former Minister of
Security and Justice, Mr. Opstelten, stated that the
problems with OMGs are persistent and severe.
According to the Minister, members of some OMGs are
relatively often connected with various criminal activi-
ties. It is argued that members of OMGs have been
striving for a key position in organised crime. OMGs
are, moreover, associated with extortion, intimidation
and violence (e.g. in the hotel and catering industry),
which has led to the belief that outlaw bikers are assum-
ing an undermining position within society. In other
words, the activities of OMGs are believed to threaten
the integrity of a democratic society. The Minister has
also pointed to signs of tax and social security fraud.
Finally, local governments have experienced a rise in the
number of OMG chapters in their municipality, which
is believed to be the cause for increased tensions
between rival OMGs. All in all, this has led to the
notion that OMGs disobey the rule of law and consider
themselves to be inviolable.71
The Minister stated that OMG members who consider
themselves untouchable and thus undermine the rule of
law need to be stopped in any possible way. Those who
violate the law should, he argued, in any way pay back
the bill.72 To put a stop to OMGs, the Dutch Minister
of Security and Justice – in cooperation with agencies
such as the Dutch National Police, local governments,
the Dutch Tax Authority, the National Intelligence and
Expertise Centre (LIEC) and the Regional Intelligence
and Expertise Centres (RIEC) – announced a whole-of-
government and zero-tolerance approach towards ‘out-
law motorcycle gangs’ in 2012. Under this whole-of-
government approach, a so-called ‘framework of barri-
ers’ (in Dutch: barrièremodel) has been developed in
order to – by means of administrative, fiscal and crimi-
nal law enforcement – raise barriers and, consequently,
prevent rule-breaking behaviour of OMGs and its mem-
bers. To do so, the Dutch Minister of Security and Jus-
tice formalised eight guidelines or priorities to fight
OMGs.73
One of these guidelines, for instance, advocates a strong
focus on OMG clubhouses. That is, in order to put a
stop to the inviolability of OMGs, local governments are
required to take a critical stance towards clubhouses and
aim to hinder the establishment of new clubhouses in
their municipality. Clubhouses that do not comply with
the local development plan or that do not have a liquor
licence are shut down with administrative force, the
ultimate goal being to lower the total number of club-
houses in the Netherlands. From January 2012 to May
2014, a total of 111 clubhouses were either closed or
deterred.74 A second guideline aims to counteract the
influence of OMGs in the hotel and catering industry.
71. Kamerstukken II, 2011/12, 29911, no. 59, at 1-2.
72. Ibid., at 1.
73. Kamerstukken II, 2011/12, 29911, no. 71.
74. Annual Progress Report Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, June 2014 (RIEC/
LIEC), available at: <www. riec. nl/ doc/ 140616 -integrale -landelijke -
voortgangsrapportage -omgs -def -2. pdf>, at 9.
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Since restaurants, pubs and clubs are expected to be
used for money laundering activities or to act as club-
houses, the main goal here is to scrutinise the possible
weaknesses of companies for any involvement with
OMGs. By cooperating with entrepreneurs, the police
and local governments aim to avoid any influence of
OMGs in the hotel and catering industry.75 The
remaining six priorities put the focus on the criminal
prosecution of OMGs and its members; hindering the
influence of OMGs within security companies and foot-
ball hooliganism; tax evasion by OMG members; OMG
members working in the public sector; and OMG-rela-
ted events. These guidelines are assumed to break the
OMGs’ inviolability, reduce their effectiveness and, as a
result, have a preventative effect.76
4 Prohibiting OMG-Related
Events
Over the past three years, the aforementioned priorities
have been the starting point for many interventions
towards OMGs in the Netherlands. To further assess
the differences between prevention and pre-emptive
strategies, I will zoom in on three cases related to the
focal point of not facilitating OMG-related events.77
According to the former Minster of Security of Justice,
‘it is important to give a clear statement that concerned
motorcycle clubs and members are being approached
and that all necessary means to do so will be used’.78
Following from this, the idea is that OMGs – by defini-
tion – should not be granted any stage or platform. This
means that especially the government should not, so it is
argued, facilitate the possibility for an OMG to organ-
ise, for example, an event. Here lies a task for the mayor
as he or she is the provider of the permit that is needed
for these events.79 Following from this, part of the
Dutch Approach thus entails the focus on the preven-
tion of OMG-related events, based on the principle that
the government should not partake in any OMG-related
event.80
As said, I will zoom in on three occasions where motor-
cycle events were cancelled by a local government (i.e.
no new permits were distributed, and granted permits
were withdrawn. The first example can be understood
75. Ibid., at 10.
76. It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a comprehensive over-
view of all eight guidelines. For a more extensive view of the ‘frame-
work of barriers’ see ibid.
77. It has to be emphasised that these three examples by no means reflect
the Dutch approach as a whole. Analysing only three occasions simply
does not offer enough ‘power’ to do so. I use these three examples
merely to initiate a discussion on the difference between prevention and
pre-emption.
78. van der Ploeg, above n. 69, at 3.
79. Ibid.
80. Annual Progress Report Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, June 2015 (RIEC/
LIEC), retrieved from: <https:// www. rijksoverheid. nl/ documenten/
rapporten/ 2015/ 06/ 12/ integrale -landelijke -voortgangsrapportage -
outlaw -motorcycle -gangs -omg -s -juni -2015>, at 12.
as a direct result of the aforementioned policy to not
facilitate any OMG-related event. The two other cases
were cancelled on the basis of the advice of the Police
not to facilitate any motorcycle-related events in April
and May of 2014. The Police has issued this advice in
the context of possible large-scale public order distor-
tions.
4.1 The ‘Brothers in Arms Run’
As I briefly mentioned in the introduction of this article,
members of the Veterans MC were planning to organise
the ‘Brothers in Arms Run’ in May of 2013, which was
supposed to involve the gathering of ex-military motor-
cyclists from various countries.81 Part of this three-day
event was a motorcycle tour planned on 11 May 2013.
However, the local government of ‘Cuijk’ prohibited
this get-together by not providing the permit that was
required for the event.82 This refusal was grounded in
public order and safety regulations, and the Mayor of
Cuijk argued that the prohibition of this event would be
in line with the prescribed nationwide policy to hinder
OMG-related events. Interestingly, after the Veterans
MC appealed against this decision in a preliminary pro-
ceeding, the Court decided that banning this event
would be unlawful.83 As a result, the ban on the ‘Broth-
ers in Arms Run’ event was lifted.
It follows from this verdict that the initial ban of the
event by the mayor was based on two arguments –first,
because of the earlier described nationwide policy of the
Ministry of Security and Justice, which proscribes sup-
port of any OMG-related events, and, second, on the
grounds of maintaining public order. In short, it was
feared that this event would attract members of other
OMGs such as the Hells Angels MC. Yet it seemed that
the mayor based his decision mainly on the policy of the
Minister of Security and Justice and, to a lesser extent,
on a report (i.e. a risk analysis of the event) created by
the Dutch National Police on 2 April 2013.84 However,
the Court reasoned that a nationwide policy in itself
cannot serve as a valid ground for prohibiting a local
event. In a case like this, the municipality is duty-bound
not to act solely on general (nationwide) policies but to
also consider the local circumstances.
The Court argued that the arguments of the municipali-
ty to cancel the planned events were based mainly on
general assumptions rather than specific risks of danger.
That is, the report by the police revealed that no previ-
ous incidents were known in respect of other events of
the Veterans MC. The ‘Brothers in Arms Run’ in 2008
– which also took place at this venue – moreover, passed
off without any trouble.85 Since the municipality was at
81. The Veterans MC is one of the motorcycle clubs that the Dutch Nation-
al Police regards as an ‘outlaw motorcycle gang’. Politie Landelijke een-
heid, above n. 2, at 23.
82. Above n. 4.
83. The outcome of this preliminary proceeding was not published by the
Court itself. Instead, the verdict was found on the website of the Veter-
ans Motorcycle Club. See <http:// veteransmc. com/ Vonnis -Voorzienin
genRechter. pdf> (last visited 11 August 2015).
84. Ibid., at no. 5.
85. Ibid., at no. 6.
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that moment unaware of any criminal investigations
related to the applicant and the event itself was not
accessible to everyone, the Dutch National Police esti-
mated the risk of public order disturbances at this event
as being low. All in all, the Court ruled that the mayor
was unable to provide enough indications that that
year’s ‘Brothers in Arms Run’ would cause serious trou-
ble or would in fact disrupt the public order.
The decision not to provide the needed permit was –
according to the Court – also based on the notion that
the Veterans MC, being a member of the Dutch Coun-
cil, is a so-called ‘outlaw motorcycle gang’.86 The sole
argument of being an ‘OMG’, however, was considered
to be inadequate to inhibit this event. Thus, although
this event was initially prohibited, the arguments put
forward by the mayor for doing so turned out to be
based mainly on (nationwide) assumptions, which could
not support the fear of any future public order distur-
bances.
4.2 The ‘Harley-Day Valkenswaard’
One year later, a somewhat similar case took place in the
municipality of Valkenswaard (located in the same prov-
ince as the municipality of Cuijk). In this case the
‘Foundation Harley-day Valkenswaard’ (in Dutch:
Stichting Harleydag Valkenswaard) requested authori-
sation for its seventh edition of the ‘Harleydag Valkens-
waard’, which was planned on 26 April 2014. This free-
ly accessible event usually involves live music, a market
for motorcycles, entertainment for children and was
expected to attract approximately 12,000 visitors. The
organisation committee received permission to carry
through their plans and activities on 26 February 2014.
However, on 28 March, one month before the event was
scheduled, the mayor of Valkenswaard revoked this per-
mit. As was the case in the preceding example, the
‘Foundation Harley-day Valkenswaard’ appealed against
this decision in a preliminary proceeding.87
The decision to revoke the permit was based on a (confi-
dential) note-of-advice of the Dutch National Police
(Police region Oost-Brabant). This note prescribed a
negative advice for all motorcycle-related events plan-
ned in April and May 2014 in the Police region of Oost-
Brabant. This advice also had a direct bearing on events
that had already been granted a permit to organise such
an event. This negative advice was based on the fear that
motorcycle events could attract OMGs, which in turn
might result in (large-scale) public order disturbances.
Besides this, the Police also made a risk assessment on
this particular event and concluded that there was a high
86. This Dutch Council, also known as the ‘Council of eight’ (in Dutch:
‘Raad van Acht’), was founded in 1996 and was regarded as a way to
reassure stability between the OMGs in the Netherlands. To take one
example, members of this Council (e.g. the Hells Angels MC, Satudarah
MC and the Veterans MC) discussed whether a motorcycle club was
allowed to wear three back-patches on their vests, which stands for
being a so-called ‘full colour MC’. At the end of 2013, the council was
dissolved after several OMGs abandoned the Council (Politie Landelijke
Eenheid, above 2, at 24-25).
87. Dutch District Court 17 April 2014, ECLI:RBOBR:2014:2146.
risk of large-scale public order disturbances.88 This con-
clusion was, among other reasons, grounded on the
notion that the Harley-day of Valkenswaard might pos-
sibly be the ideal platform for the Bandidos MC to pro-
voke the Hells Angels MC.89 This stemmed from the
idea that members of the latter are well-known visitors
to this particular event and are generally seen as being in
dispute with the Bandidos MC. Thus, the possibility of
the Bandidos MC attending this event was believed to
result in heightened tensions and possible public order
and safety disturbances. At the same time, the Police
reported that it was still not certain or at least somewhat
uncertain that if both clubs met, it would indeed come
to a direct confrontation.90 Some concern also related to
the uncertainty surrounding the position of chapters of
No Surrender MC, which might be taken over by the
Bandidos MC. It was, furthermore, argued that as other
motorcycle events in the same area were also cancelled,
allowing the ‘Harley-day Valkenswaard’ could instigate
a ‘honeypot effect’ for various OMGs. Overall, the may-
or of Valkenswaard attached more significance to safe-
guarding the public order and safety at the expense of
the interests of the ‘Foundation Harley-day Valkens-
waard’.91
The Court argued that the mayor was justified in
grounding his decision on the risk assessment made by
the police. That is, the assessment contained risks that
related directly to this particular event. So contrary to
the previous case, local circumstances were taken into
account on this occasion. The assessment was believed
to be grounded in a realistic threat as the risk of a con-
flict between the Hells Angels MC and the Bandidos
MC was deemed plausible.92
4.3 The ‘Easter Show DCA Motorcycles’
On the same day, the same Court ruled differently in yet
another similar case. In this case, the owner of a motor-
cycle shop (‘DCA Motorcycles’) applied for a permit to
organise a relatively small event on 21 April 2014. This
event was set up as an ‘open day’ to promote the compa-
ny of ‘DCA Motorcycles’. However, the mayor refused
to provide the company with the needed permit for fear
of public order and safety disturbances.93
The mayor followed the same note-of-advice of the
Police as was referred to in the previous case (i.e. advis-
ing against all motorcycle-related events in April and
May). This fear for disturbances was fuelled mainly by
the fact that all other motorcycle-related events in
neighbouring municipalities were also cancelled.94 The
mayor did not intend to make an exception for this
event, as this was believed to have the effect of drawing
88. Ibid., at no. 1.
89. The Bandidos MC set up its first chapters in the Netherlands in March
2014 (Politie Landelijke eenheid, above n. 2, at 20).
90. Dutch District Court, above n. 87, at no. 1.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid., at no. 13.
93. <www. omroepbrabant. nl/ ?news/ 209463932/ Helmond+geeft+geen
+vergunning+voor+paasshow+van+motorwinkel+DCA+Motorcycles.
aspx> (last visited 11 August 2015).
94. Dutch District Court 17 April 2014, ECLI:RBOBR:2014:2271, at no. 5.
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several OMGs to this particular event (resulting in a
possible confrontation between warring OMGs). This
was because members of OMGs had no other event to
attend during this period and were therefore expected to
go to any other motorcycle-related event that was availa-
ble. As was the case in the previous examples, ‘DCA
Motorcycles’ also appealed against this decision.95
In short, the Court argued that the report of the Police
(advising against all motorcycle-related events in April
and May) alone offered an unsatisfactory argument for
refusing a permit for this particular event. The argu-
ment that this event would have been the only motorcy-
cle-related event and would thus attract much attention
from OMGs was not adequately justified. In other
words, the mayor provided not enough concrete indica-
tions that the assumed disturbances of conflicting
OMGs would take place at this particular venue.96
Overall, the mayor should have motivated more precise-
ly why the refusal of this permit was necessary. Conse-
quently, the Court argued that the mayor had unjustly
refused to provide ‘DCA Motorcycles’ with the
required permit.
5 Pre-Empting OMG-Related
Events
Having described these three cases, the next step is to
apply the ‘framework of pre-emption’ outlined in Sec-
tion 2; to what extent can these cases be understood
through the concept of pre-emption?
The first distinction between the concepts of prevention
and pre-emption relates to the difference between ‘risk
management’ and ‘risk control’. As I have explained,
pre-emption aims to prevent harm and danger at all
costs. This is done not solely by managing risks, but by
taking complete control over a ‘risky’ situation. Either by
retrieving a permit or by not providing a permit, to
begin with, the mayors in the foregoing examples aimed
to ensure that these particular events would not take
place. So – apart from the question of whether these
decisions were legally justified – the mayors sought to
take full control over the risks related to these events,
and thus strived for maximum security. The costs of
retrieving such a permit (e.g. expenditure made by the
organising committee) were deemed less important than
the possible risks arising from the event. A simple
example of a strategy that would have taken these ‘costs’
into account would be the increase of police surveillance
during the permitted event. By doing this, the risk of
public disorder would be minimised and managed, while
a certain amount of risk was still tolerated (i.e. the event
is permitted, which leaves open the opportunity of
OMGs disrupting the event). By prohibiting an event
beforehand, the respective mayors do not accept any
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid., at no. 9.
risk of danger and thus aim to take control over the risks
related to the event.
Another important (interrelated) concept that explains
the difference between pre-emption and prevention
strategies is ‘uncertainty’. That is, pre-emptive strat-
egies tend to avert dangers whose manifestation is yet
highly uncertain. However, a lack of knowledge about
the problem at hand does not constitute a barrier to the
implementation of a controlling measure. In this regard,
it is relevant to review what the underlying rationale for
taking action was in the aforementioned examples. Con-
sidering the first example (‘The Brothers in Arms
Run’), the Court ruled that the decision to cancel the
event was based mainly on the nationwide policy imple-
mented by the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice,
that is, not to facilitate an OMG-related event to begin
with. In fact, the Police assessed the risk of large-scale
public disorder during this event as being low. The
decision to cancel the event was thus grounded in a
more general policy line rather than in concrete indica-
tions that the event would actually cause any trouble. I
therefore tend to conclude that – especially considering
the fact that previous occasions of this event did not
cause notable troubles – there was a great amount of
uncertainty about the dangers of this particular event.
The second example (‘Harley-day Valkenswaard’) rea-
ches a somewhat different conclusion. On this occasion,
the Court argued that the municipality had based its
decision to cancel the event on more local and concrete
risk indications. In fact, this decision was grounded in a
risk assessment linked to the local circumstances of the
event. The third event (‘Easter show DCA Motorcy-
cles’) was, however, banned on the basis of a more
uncertain and general risk. As the remaining motorcycle
events in that period were also banned, the mayor
assumed that this event would attract significantly more
motorcycle enthusiasts and, more importantly, more
OMGs as well. The general presumption of this possi-
ble gathering of (rival) OMGs acted as a ground on
which to refuse the necessary permit. According to the
Court, this line of reasoning was not justified, or in oth-
er words, the risk of such a danger was deemed yet too
uncertain to justify banning this event. Thus, it is not so
much uncertainty as such (of some particular future
danger) that is of importance here; the occurrence of
future dangers is always to some extent uncertain. This
particular danger was, however, regarded as too uncer-
tain and not sufficiently backed up by a concrete risk
assessment, which thus did not reasonably justify the
cancellation of the event beforehand.
The third difference relates to the importance of risk
assessments. It was argued that decisions under the log-
ic-of-pre-emption are to a lesser extent the result of risk
assessments. Prevention strategies are based on risk
assessments that take the gravity of the particular risk
into consideration, while pre-emption, on the other
hand, is grounded in the idea that risks are not accepted
to begin with. Overall, one cannot conclude that the
importance of risk assessments in the aforementioned
examples is reduced to zero. In fact, the Dutch National
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Police made a risk assessment on the specific and local
dangers of the ‘Harley-day Valkenswaard’ event, which
made the mayor of Valkenswaard decide to cancel the
event. As a result, this case can hardly be typified as a
form of pre-emption. In the case of the ‘Easter show
DCA Motorcycles’, however, such a specific risk assess-
ment was absent. That is, its refusal was based mainly
on general assumptions, and no sufficient cause was
provided as to why public disorder was to be expected at
this specific local and small event. In the first example,
the role of a risk assessment is somewhat different. As
previously mentioned, ‘The Brothers in Arms Run’ was
cancelled mainly on the basis of the national guideline
forbidding facilitation of any OMG-related events
issued by the former Minister of Security and Justice in
2012. This is not to say that there was no risk assess-
ment drawn up for this particular event to begin with.
However, this risk assessment revealed that the risk of
any danger was perceived as low. Hence, although a risk
assessment was actually drawn up, its conclusions did
not constitute a decisive role for the adopted decision to
cancel the planned event. This risk assessment thus
seems to have had no or a marginal role in the decision
to cancel the event. The fact that the latter event was
organised by a listed OMG itself (unlike the other two
events) seemed to have played a decisive role in cancel-
ling the event.
5.1 Pre-Emption: The Denial of Rationality
As I have tried to explain in the first section of this arti-
cle, pre-emptive strategies – similarly to prevention
strategies – aim to prevent risk of dangers. The exam-
ples in this article similarly focus on changing situations
that are believed to facilitate dangers. The motorcycle
events are regarded as situations that might facilitate a
clash between rival OMGs, which ultimately would lead
to a situation of public disorder. Although it might be
true that the Police had indications of a possible clash
between rivalling OMGs, this fear inherently constitu-
ted an uncertain and perceived risk. However, whether
or not any danger will occur in the future is inherently
uncertain for all types of future dangers. It would thus
be too simplistic and unjust to – for this reason – ‘label’
these cases as examples of pre-emption. In fact, given
the infamous reputation of some OMGs, it is under-
standable for a mayor to be on his guard with OMG-
related events. Revoking permits for events can be
regarded as a useful way to prevent possible public dis-
order and, more precisely, a clash between warring
OMGs. By cancelling such an event beforehand, how-
ever, the local government tries not only to minimise the
risks (‘risk management’), but also to foreclose all possi-
ble risks in such a way that the level of risk is reduced to
zero. The uncertain risk of public disorder is not accep-
ted as the event – by not providing the needed permit –
cannot pose any danger to public security to begin with.
Thus, one could state that in the aforementioned exam-
ples, the local government tries to neutralise or take
total control over the ‘risky situation’. As a result, as the
events cited in this article were cancelled beforehand,
the possibility of any public disorder became real in its
consequences. That is, the feared yet not materialised
danger is acted upon (by means of cancellation) as if this
danger will materialise. The consequence is real in the
sense that the event is actually cancelled and, conse-
quently, cannot be attended to begin with.
Not providing a permit for a motorcycle event also can-
cels out the possibility that (in these cases) OMG mem-
bers will not use the event to cause any trouble (‘false
positive’). Where prevention strategies solely try to alter
one’s decision-making process, pre-emptive strategies
thus take a more radical step by ensuring that the indi-
viduals do not come in a situation where he or she is
able to make his or her own rational decision. A strategy
of prevention would have, for instance, advocated –
after the event was permitted – initiation, for example,
of more police surveillance at the particular venue. This
strategy would still have treated visiting OMG members
as rational individuals capable of making their own cal-
culated decisions. By treating the uncertain as certain,
and thus by taking total control over an uncertain situa-
tion, one cancels out the possibility that a subject (i.e.
members of OMGs) will not cause any trouble. In this
way, pre-emptive strategies tend to disrespect what
Smilansky has termed the ‘window of moral opportuni-
ty’.97
It is important to emphasise here that it would be wrong
to suggest that cancelling any risky event beforehand
would subsequently make an example of pre-emption.
In fact, the decision to cancel the ‘Harley-day Valkens-
waard’ clearly showed a relation to the outcome of a risk
assessment that qualified this event as a ‘high-risk’
event. The mayor in this case thus seems not to have
cancelled this event in order to take full control over
‘uncertainty’, but actually based his decision on concrete
risk indications. Interestingly, the ‘Brothers in Arms
Run’, on the other hand, was prohibited because of a
more general and political line of reasoning that a
municipality should not make OMG-related events (e.g.
parties organised by an OMG) possible to begin with (in
this case by not providing a permit). The general notion
that OMGs should not be granted any stage and that the
government should not partake in any of its activities
proscribes to cancel out, or raise barriers, to various
OMG-related activities beforehand. Not providing a
permit because of this line of reasoning, as the latter
case shows, causes the role of ‘the risk assessment’ to
fade into the background. That is, when put into prac-
tice, the decision not to provide a permit for an OMG-
related event is decoupled from the outcome of a risk
assessment (e.g. the risk of a possible clash between war-
ring OMGs).
Therefore, the ‘denial’ of one’s ability to make law-abid-
ing decisions becomes mostly apparent when looking at
this latter case, as this example followed from the gener-
al focus on OMGs as briefly described in Section 3, and
not from concrete and situation-specific risks. The
belief of prohibiting any OMG-related event before-
97. S. Smilansky, ‘The Time to Punish’, 54 analysis 50 (1994), at 52.
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hand (regardless of its ‘riskiness’), subsequently takes
away the capacity of OMG members to decide not to act
in a disorderly or criminal way, which denies the ration-
ality of its members. The notion that local governments
should not facilitate any OMG events by definition,
seems to move beyond the statement of the former Min-
ister of Security and Justice (Section 3) that those who
transgress the law should, in any way, pay back the bill.
While the latter refers to a reaction to misconduct (tit for
tat), the former pre-empts the possibility of misdemean-
or by making sure there is nothing to be paid back.
6 Conclusion
It is clear that today’s crime fighting policies attach
much relevance to the prevention of crime. Quite sim-
ply, crime fighting today constitutes more than only
reacting to criminal conduct by tracking down and pros-
ecuting criminals. This preventative shift has been dis-
cussed in much detail by many scholars. At the same
time, some authors have argued that some prevention
strategies are increasingly based on the principle of pre-
emption. While such pre-emptive strategies also aim to
prevent crimes, it is believed that pre-emption is some-
what different from what is commonly understood as
prevention. This article was an attempt to untangle the
broad and all-embracing term of crime prevention by
exploring and untangling the differences between pre-
vention and pre-emption. This was done by analysing
three examples in which local governments tried to pre-
vent a motorcycle club-related event from taking place.
Although the three cases are most certainly not perfectly
clear examples of pre-emption, the present analysis has
shown that there might indeed be different underlying
rationales to be recognised, which justifies the statement
that pre-empting crime is different from preventing
crime. Overall, the distinction between pre-emptive and
prevention strategies can be found in how one deals
with the uncertainty inherently related to the future risk
of danger. The measures described in this article aimed
to take full control over the uncertain risk related to a
particular event. In other words, the uncertainty sur-
rounding the problem of OMGs (e.g. a possible clash
between the Hells Angels MC and the Bandidos MC)
called for a far-reaching strategy in an attempt to control
(and not only manage) the feared danger before it
actually emerged. One could say that, as the risk of pub-
lic disorder was not accepted to begin with, the feared
danger became real in its consequences. Under pre-
emption, the uncertainty surrounding a threat is thus
treated as certain. It must be noted, however, that the
denial of the permit in the case of the ‘Harley-day Val-
kenswaard’ was based largely on a specific and locally
embedded risk assessment, which clearly makes that this
case cannot be explained through the concept of pre-
emption. The role of a risk assessment was, however,
rather marginal in the ‘Brothers in Arms Run’ case, as
the Mayor of Cuijk based his decision largely on a gen-
eral approach that OMGs are not to be facilitated by the
government. Such a belief devalues the role of risk
assessments and treats an uncertain risk as certain. By
doing so, it also denies the possibility that OMG mem-
bers will not cause trouble at one of these events.
I think it is important to emphasise that – with this arti-
cle – I do not claim that the Dutch approach as a whole
is to be characterised as a pre-emptive approach. As
already noted, the difference between prevention and
pre-emption constitutes a gradual difference, and ‘reali-
ty’ could be too complex to clearly distinguish a preven-
tion strategy from a pre-emptive strategy. To come to
such a conclusion, more empirical research is needed
(e.g. interviews with the people responsible for taking
the decision to refuse a permit for a ‘risky’ event). With
this article, I merely attempted to start a theoretical dis-
cussion about the difference between the two concepts,
without drawing any hasty conclusions about the Dutch
approach towards OMGs as such. However, I do believe
that this article provided enough reason to do more
empirical research into the concept of ‘pre-emption’. I
will elaborate somewhat more on why this is the case in
the following discussion.
7 Discussion
Until now, the difference between pre-emptive strat-
egies and prevention strategies seems to be only a matter
of theoretical and abstract importance. However, I
believe that accentuating this difference is not only the-
oretically interesting, but also important in a more prac-
tical way. I would like to take this opportunity to
endorse what has been argued by Matthias Borgers. He
stated that it is important to keep an eye on what one
wants to achieve by implementing pre-emptive meas-
ures and also to pay more attention to the possible nega-
tive effects of such strategies.98 In my opinion, it is pos-
sible to come to a greater realisation and understanding
of the effects of certain crime policy strategies by mak-
ing a clearer distinction between pre-emption and pre-
vention. This article has revealed that prevention and
pre-emptive strategies have different underlying ration-
ales. Both strategies have different goals. For instance,
the former Minister of Security and Justice, Mr.
Opstelten, has pointed to the importance of not facilitat-
ing any OMG-related events as one of the eight guide-
lines to fight OMGs. This article has advocated the the-
sis that not providing a permit for an OMG-related
event because of possible public disorder is not a pre-
vention strategy per se. It is a pre-emptive strategy in
the sense that it treats the uncertain future as certain by
treating OMG members as being incapable of making
rule-abiding decisions. In order words, it acts upon the
presumption that the event will in fact cause a conflict
between various OMGs. Initially, one could argue that
not granting a permit to begin with is a far less expen-
98. M.J. Borgers, De vlucht naar voren (2007).
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sive measure compared with, for example, the enforce-
ment of more police surveillance around the event itself.
However, this line of reasoning would nullify the idea
that a stringent pre-emptive strategy might also have
negative consequences not only for the organising party,
but for the state agency as well. To cite a simple exam-
ple, could the prohibition of all OMG-related events
during a period result in a shift towards more illegal
OMG events out of sight of the Police and the local gov-
ernment? Is it thus possible that such a pre-emptive log-
ic is based on the false impression that it can indeed
fully ‘control’ this risky situation beforehand, or do such
measures simply result in other new uncertainties that
are even more difficult to control? Although this article
has been dominated by the case of OMGs, the discussed
distinction undoubtedly fits within the broader context
of how state agencies cope with the (uncertain) risk of
dangers. For instance, how do local governments and
the Police cope with ‘risky’ sport games (i.e. feared hoo-
liganism), and how should we understand the (preventa-
tive) strategies put forward with respect to returning
Syria fighters? Research has shown that the closing of
all brothels located on the so-called ‘Zandpad’ in
Utrecht in 2013 did not help much to prevent human
trafficking.99 Could this be the result of the local gov-
ernment’s attempt to foreclose and control the problem
by means of pre-emption? By thinking about these types
of questions I would like to argue in favour of making a
clearer distinction between pre-emptive and prevention
strategies as it helps to think about the effects, limita-
tions and consequences of crime policies. All in all,
although the pre-emption–prevention distinction seems
to be a theoretical and somewhat simulated distinction
at first, it can be an interesting distinction to consider
for law enforcement agencies and (local) governments.
It forces agencies to reconsider whether the chosen ‘pre-
ventative path’ effectively prevents the commitment of
crimes, or whether it only pre-empts uncertain and, to
some extent, generalised risks that are inherently impos-
sible to eliminate.
99. D. Siegel, Het Zandpad – closing brothels or closing eyes? Utrechtse
sekswerkers na sluiting van het Zandpad (2015).
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